CMPD RELEASED 2012 CRIME STATISTICS

CHIEF MONROE’S STORY PROMOTING 24-HOUR SURVEILLANCE

During a 1/23/13 press conference, Charlotte’s Police Chief Rodney Monroe announced a 9.5% increase in violent crime for 2012, but according to WSOCTV, “Monroe hopes technology put in place for the DNC will help bring that number down this year.”

Monroe went on to say the new Command Center had already helped close a murder case this year when “On Jan. 7 officers in the Hickory Grove Division were investigating a homicide on Farm Pond Lane. When police arrived, they found Monte Gay shot, and he was taken to the hospital, where he died.  Witnesses pointed police to a man named Bret Samuels, who was on electronic monitoring, and records showed he had been in the area of the shooting at the time.  Within two hours, police had a suspect in custody.”

Here are a couple of problems with his rationale:  1) The Command Center has been up and running for much of 2012, but crime statistics are up 9.5 % anyway, and 2) Electronic Ankle Bracelets have been in place and monitored for years.  If electronic monitoring is what caught the homicide suspect, it would not have required the DNC-funded Command Center.

2012 CREATIVE CRIME STATISTIC REPORTING

While it’s great that there were three less murders in 2012 than in 2011, much of the credit probably goes to paramedics and hospital staff—and to quick response of police officers responding to get those who were shot or stabbed to medical help.  The statistics on attempted murder are rolled into lesser charges.  Statistics for everyone who lived through 2012 in Charlotte are less encouraging:

Murders decreased 5.5 %

Rape    increased 4 %

Robbery  increased 12 %, with Armed Robbery increasing 14 %

Aggravated Assault  increased 9 %

Burglary is reported as down about 9 %

Larceny Totals are reported as  increasing about 6 %, with

Shoplifting  increasing over 18 % *

Vehicle Theft  Increased 2 %

Arson decreased 0.5 %

Overall:

Violent Crime Reported increased 9.5 %

Property Crime Reported increased 1.8 %

HOW MANY MURDERS WERE THERE IN 2012?

It’s hard to say what numbers are being reported.  If you examine the individual division numbers per CMPD’s site and add up the 2012 murder totals for each of 13 divisions, they total 49, not the 52 total given for the City for the year.  If three murders were committed somewhere outside of Divisions, but included in the totals, then what does that say about the validity of the rest of the crime numbers?  Or is there some other explanation for these two numbers not matching?

Similarly, adding up rapes reported among divisions brings a total of 205, but the City total is reported as 219.  There are 1635 robberies added up, vs. 1798 reported as the total.  Etcetera.  

Since CMPD is basing their reported increases and decreases in crime on these numbers, an explanation is in order.  If the total number of crimes reported as 38,014 for 2012 and 36,980 for 2011 are based on faulty, misleading, or just unclear reports or calculations, that needs to be clarified or corrected.

FREEDOM DIVISION: PINS FOR BEST 2012 CRIME REDUCTION

Chief Monroe applauded the Freedom Division for crime reduction and gave out pins to commemorate accomplishments.  Monroe said the Freedom Division demonstrated the best overall reduction at 3.5%.  However, violent crime was up 22.5% in Freedom, with Robbery up 31%, Rape up 8%, and Aggravated Assault up 22%.  Murders dropped from 4 in 2011 to 1 in 2012, and Burglary and Larceny statistics were way down.

COMPARE TO PROVIDENCE DIVISION, 2011 PIN WINNERS FOR BEST CRIME REDUCTION

Last year, Monroe began his pinning tradition by awarding them to Captain Martha Dozier and the Providence Division for a drop in 2011 reported crime statistics.  Now her 2012 Crime Statistics show:

Murders increased 67 %

Rape increased 30 %

Strong-armed Robbery increased 38 %

Aggravated Assault increased 12 %

Residential Burglary increased 11 %

Shoplifting increased 55 %  

with overall larceny increasing 6 %

Vehicle Theft increased 4 %

Arson increased 233 %

NOTE SIGNIFICANT INCREASES THIS YEAR IN SHOPLIFTING REPORTED

* The marked increase in reported shoplifting must be considered.  Last year, Citynewswatch reported the little-known SHOP (Shoplifting Offender Project) program employed by CMPD that seemed to be a way to keep larceny numbers off the books.  Inquiries to the State, FBI and CMPD to get accurate Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) statistics required by the FBI and other agencies hit dead ends in many cases, but maybe there was an internal response.  Only a full audit will tell for sure, but it would be a big coincidence if suddenly 20% more incidences of shoplifting started occurring after the diversion program was exposed.  Maybe it’s just a sign of the economic times or law enforcement focus.

If you read this SHOP post, you will see that the 2008 and 2009 CMPD Annual Reports have been removed from the web, and have not been returned.  Those are the first two years of Rodney Monroe’s tenure as Police Chief in Charlotte.  Why have they been removed?  What information is problematic?  2005, 2006, and 2007 are still present. 

PUBLIC STILL IN THE DARK

Watch Commander Logs, Significant Event Logs, and other major public crime information Chief Monroe had removed from the web site still hasn't been restored, and it doesn't look promising it will ever happen.

TOP SECRET STRETCHING

Millions have been spent on the DNC-funded “Command Center” used to install video cameras, microphones and “Shot Spotter” microphone systems, along with extra License Plate Reader's, or LPR’s (cameras that capture and store the locations and actions of tens of thousands of license plates of innocent travelers as they look for a few possible violators).  Monroe still won’t release any Operating Procedures for these devices, who is authorized to use them, who is authorized to access the data, how long it will be stored, whether the data is being uploaded to any outside agencies or companies, or what the total costs are.  There is no data to substantiate the use of this equipment or data, and now Monroe is claiming the old electronic monitoring ankle bracelets are part of the new technology—making any claim necessary to associate catching a murder suspect with his expensive Command Center.

The CMPD and City STILL have not released dollars spent on this “top-secret” technology for security reasons, according to Police Chief Rodney Monroe and recently-retired City Manager Curt Walton.  Tax payers were told they had to wait until after the DNC Convention first week of September, 2012, ended to be told how the security dollars had been spent.  More than four months later, is there still a security threat to the visiting dignitaries last Fall?

No.

The finances for security spending still haven’t been disclosed.

TASER CONSULTANT STUDY COMPLETED WELL AFTER PURCHASE

TASER CONSULTANT STUDY COMPLETED WELL AFTER PURCHASE

Citynewswatch has acquired a copy of the PERF (Police Executive Research Forum) report that was commissioned by Charlotte Mecklenburg Police Chief Rodney Monroe regarding use of “Electronic Control Weapons” or ECW’s (brand name TASERs) in Charlotte. 

Rodney Monroe and the City of Charlotte initially claimed they commissioned the study to help them decide about making a purchase of new TASER X-2’s that cost tax payers almost $2 Million.  However, the date on this PERF investigative research is not until November 7, 2011—a full SEVEN weeks after TASER came to celebrate the purchase, and started advertising the purchase all over the internet as a way to promote sales to other Law Enforcement Agencies. 

In addition, that purchase was not approved by City Council until the evening of September 26th, just after executives, legal representatives, and media experts from TASER, INC. came to treat the CMPD brass to lunch and tips on how to handle the press and those pesky legal issues.

Then there’s the odd thing that contained in the PERF study that Monroe says he commissioned to decide how to proceed about ECW’s is a conclusion that CMPD “plan a Cautious, Measured Reintroduction of ECWs. It is the department’s intention to issue the newly acquired X-2 TASERs® to its officers…”

So much for a careful study of what action to take. 

Next, we discovered the purchase contracts for the TASER PURCHASE and the PERF STUDY were signed on the same date—late October.  CMPD attorney Judy Emken had sent written notice that the contracts were not signed a few days before they were… well it’s just all a mess.  And there was no executable date on the PERF contract at all.  See all the details here.

No one from the City Attorney’s office, the City Council, or City Manager will answer questions about these questionable practices (at least not yet).

PERF CONTRACT FINALLY IN HAND

Here are some highlights from the PERF study

Police Executive Research Forum

Review of Electronic Control Weapon Polices and Training in the

Charlotte–Mecklenburg Police Department

…to conduct a review of it policies, training and practices as they

relate to the deployment of Electronic Control Weapons.  PERF collected written directives, training curricula, lesson plans and other documents relevant to the use of ECWs, as well as information regarding all ECW deployments in the field over a 2 ½ year period including two instances in which ECW deaths occurred. PERF then interviewed members of the CMPD command staff and other members with expertise in key areas to address questions necessary to gain a thorough understanding of the practices and methods governed by the collected written directives and training materials.

PERF convened a two-day meeting of the panel at the CMPD on October 15-16, 2011.

…panelists personally met with and interviewed the Chief, command staff and others regarding any remaining clarification of issues before convening their own meeting.

The panel discussions and deliberation included:

• critical events leading to Chief Monroe’s decision to engage PERF and temporarily suspend ECW use,

•how ECW use is integrated into the CMPD’s existing Use of Force Policies,

• the level at which ECWs are currently placed in the CMPD’s force continuum,

• prohibitions and restrictions on use of ECWs,

• the amount of officer discretion that is granted,

• ECW incident reporting – supervisory review – and use of information captured by ECWs,

• existing ECW policy, training, and practice compared to nationally accepted best practices, including the 2011 Electronic control Weapon Guidelines developed as a joint project of PERF and the Community Oriented Policing Services Office of the U.S. Department of Justice.

• further steps CMPD should consider to minimize risk associated to ECW use.

PERF recommended six key areas that needed to be changed:

1. Authorize ECW Use When Faced with Active Aggression. The CMPD’s Written Directives 600-019, 600-019A, and 600-020 should be modified to reflect that officers are authorized to deploy ECWs in response to Active Aggression or Aggravated Active Aggression – at the same level as impact weapons. Consistent terms and definitions describing justification for ECW use should be used throughout the department’s written directives and training materials.

The current placement of ECWs in the Use of Force Continuum2 does not clearly identify the actions for which ECW use is appropriate. By aligning the conditions for ECW use with those of impact weapons, officers will have unambiguous guidance as to when the use of en ECW is sanctioned.

2. Strengthen Focus on Decision Making, De-escalation and Defensive Tactics. The department’s training has for years emphasized the importance of decision making, strategically placing it before tactics in the recruit curriculum. With the impending acquisition of new and versatile simulation (FATS) equipment, there will be more training opportunities to challenge officers’ decision-making skills and encourage them – when safe to do so – to resolve situations by slowing things down, de-escalating overall tension and stress, utilizing available resources and working toward a solution that avoids or minimizes use of force.

This is not to suggest that officers are not making good decisions or relying heavily on force, but rather to dispel long-standing thinking by officers that when they attend firearms training it is only about marksmanship and proficiency. Whether it is firearms or ECWs, effective decision-making can be developed when training demands officers to consider the full range of available options (i.e. de-escalation, defensive tactics, and a spectrum of weapons).

3. Emphasize the Need for Better Understanding When Dealing with Special Populations. The mentally ill, persons in severe stress (i.e. excited delirium), those suffering from disabilities or significant medical conditions, non-English speaking persons, pregnant women, children and the elderly can all present challenges to officers responding to calls in which they must deal with their special needs. This is particularly 2 The CMPD Use of Force Continuum is reflected on page 14 of this report. true when officers seek compliance with their lawful orders. Whether it is because the person does not understand the commands given, or cannot or refuses to comply because of an underlying complication (e.g. pregnant women or elderly persons unable to get down quickly, if at all), officers must engage in an assessment of the actual threat and respond with the best option(s) for the situation and the capabilities or limitations of the persons involved. CMPD training already acknowledges that conflict resolution as a wider issue than just when or how to utilize any particular force option. For example, in recruit training, communications and persuasive skills are taught before officers are trained in defensive tactics and use of weapons. With the acquisition of new simulation equipment, the department intends to further challenge officers to find the best way – from a wide range of options – to resolve problems that are presented. This is a good start. However, there should be emphasis on the balance between officers’ obligations to protect themselves and innocent others and minimizing harm to the subject of the call. There should be consideration given to the severity of the threat the subject poses to the public. This is especially true when dealing with special populations when a subject’s actions may not be understood. Resolving conflict when dealing with all those who fall within special populations can often be more complex than among the general population. Non-traditional solutions may be called for. To better train officers to recognize the best solutions under stress, and while dealing with persons who may themselves be under stress, or whose compliance with orders may be restricted because of a limiting aspect of their condition, the department should rely on experts within the mental health community and other medical professionals to assist in the design of key aspects of this training. Training of this nature needs to be expanded to include all officers, but especially those in the field regularly called upon to resolve problems, and who make force decisions. Training is also vital for first-line supervisors whose prompt presence at critical incidents and experience is invaluable. Classroom training should include not only de-escalation and calming techniques which are particularly helpful when dealing with the mentally ill and persons under severe stress, but also specifics about other special populations, and the conditions that can be obstacles to officers’ attempts to resolve problems in the best possible way. Simulated scenario training should integrate the use of persuasive skills as well as present officers with situations involving special populations in which force-free and minimal-force solutions are achievable and desirable.

4. Stage Resources When Responding to High Risk Calls. Working to accomplish the best outcome does not rest completely with responding officers. Pursuant to policy, when telecommunicators suspect a case of excited delirium they are to relay that information to responding officers and initiate an EMS response. This should be expanded to any situation about which a telecommunicator has concern that a person under extreme stress or suffering from a condition that could present a risk to him/herself, the officer, or others. In these instances, a supervisor should be dispatched to the call. When requested by the responding officer or supervisor, a Crisis Intervention trained officer, if available, should be dispatched.  When in the responding supervisor’s judgment the call poses significant risk, the supervisor may opt to stage the response to allow adequate or special resources to arrive in a coordinated manner and thereby increase control and reduce risk to officers and subjects. It has been the experience of other departments that a staged response with prompt supervisory arrival can tend to “slow down” or calm circumstances that otherwise could compel a first arriving officer to take an escalated force action.

5. Review Some Use of Force Reports at the Executive Command level. Use of Force Reports should continue to be reviewed by the officer’s chain of command – with each reviewer having the opportunity to return the report to the supervisor who completed it for additional detail or re-evaluation of justification, or forward the matter to the Internal Affairs Division for further investigation. However the final review of reports involving more than hard empty hand control should rest with a designated member of the Chief’s Executive Staff, who also may approve the report as written, send it back for additional detail or revaluation of justification, or forward the matter to the Internal Affairs Division for further investigation.  This review should focus not only on the completeness of Use of Force Reports and command’s assessment of findings, but also the identification of patterns, trends or changes in the challenges facing officers that justify use of force and how officers are reacting to these challenges. Having this review conducted by a direct report to the Chief (if just for this quality control purpose) will help to ensure a greater degree of consistency among organizational components and an awareness by all of the importance placed on accurate reporting and comprehensive, meaningful investigation/review of use of force incidents. Moreover, because reviews could potentially identify concerns with training, investigations, or policy, the authority of the official vested with this responsibility should be at a level to direct organizational activities.   Copies of all Use of Force Reports should be directed to the Training Division for review to identify areas in which future training should be considered and specific situations that could serve as the basis for future scenario training.

6. Plan a Cautious, Measured Reintroduction of ECWs. It is the department’s intention to issue the newly acquired X 2 TASERs® to its officers once policies and training revisions are completed and officers are trained on the new weapon. This reintroduction of ECWs to field officers will be incremental. As officers complete the required training, they will be permitted to carry them. Given the number of officers to be trained and outfitted with these weapons, this will take a minimum of 27 training days. However, it is recommended that the department coordinate the reintroduction of ECWs with public information releases describing the steps that have been taken to safeguard both the public and officers. As the new ECWs are issued, the public should be informed of the department’s initiatives, which include:

• The revision of ECW policies and enhancement of ECW training materials.

• The purchase of new ECWs that reduce risk by limiting cycle time.

• The retraining of all officers with the new model ECW.

• The department’s impending acquisition of a new simulator training system that will integrate firearm, ECW, and other defensive tactical training with instruction in de-escalation techniques.

• The adoption of a coordinated response approach to high-risk calls in order to enhance incident management and risk reduction.

• A renewed training focus to reinforce the department’s efforts in finding non-force resolutions whenever possible and relying on force only when necessary. Informing the public of these initiatives in an honest and transparent manner and stressing the department’s need to keep both the public and officers safe is essential in gaining community understanding and support. The department cannot rely solely on the media to make its efforts known. Officers as well as officials should convey this information at its Citizen Academy workshops, community meetings, etc.   The department should invite its criminal justice partners (judges, prosecutors, public defenders, etc.), political leaders and elected officials, and community leaders, and the media to participate in the kinds of simulated scenario training that officers will go through. Having to make critical, life-or-death decisions quickly and under stress affords those not in law enforcement a unique opportunity to experience the split-second decisions officers are called upon to make.

PERF says use the term “LESS-LETHAL”

All reference to the term “Non Deadly Force” should be eliminated from the directive and replaced with “Less Lethal.” Likewise in Section III, the definitions of “Less Lethal Option” and Non-Deadly Force” should be incorporated into a single “Less Lethal Force” definition. Law enforcement has come to understand the use of the terms like “Non-Lethal” and “Non-Deadly force” do not belong in directives or training as it is provides the misconception to officers and the public that its use will never result in deadly consequences. In reality, any use of force could, under specific circumstances, could be lethal.

• All references of “Electronic Control Device” or “ECD” should be replaced with Electronic Control Weapon” and “ECW.” ECWs are Less-Lethal Weapons and should not be referred to as tools or devices. Calling them other than a weapon gives a false impression to officer and the public.

The department is replacing its 15 year old Firearms Training Simulator (FATS) with new one that employs some 400 preloaded scenarios and offers the department the capability to build and enter its own scenarios using actual situations that have involved CMPD officers

The CMPD’s public information officer should receive extensive training on ECWs and specifically the X 2 TASER® so he/she can better inform the media and the public about the weapon.

STILL NO CONTRACT ALLOWING ADVERTISEMENT FOR TASER, INC.

CMPD attorney Judy Emken, Rodney Monroe, Public Affairs Captain Brian Cunningham, and others have received requests for months for the separate contract that would be required allowing CMPD to advertise for TASER, Inc.  They have denied this public record with no justification. 

We paid $2 Million for these TASERS under circumstances with several incorrect contracts already.  We should be able to see if any outside transactions are happening for an extremely valuable commodity to TASER, INC:  to say they sold a couple thousand of their brand new TASER X-2’s to the Charlotte Mecklenburg Police Department. 

Do you think they advertised that the brand new TASER X-2’s didn’t work on arrival?  Probably not.  It seems the rush to manufacture a new TASER that might limit manufacturer liability in lawsuits since the “5 seconds-at-a-time limit” would be applied caused a possible delay in shipping and getting the software just right.

Use SEARCH bar at right to find all previous posts on TASER, or any other topic.

SHOP for Better Crime Statistics (Part 7)

WHAT HAPPENED TO 2008 AND 2009?

2005, 2006, 2007 CMPD Annual Reports for CMPD are hosted on the Charmeck.org web site. 

The first two years that Rodney Monroe was here, 2008 and 2009, are missing.  Why? 
What information is in there that the City doesn’t want accessed?  Citynewswatch has a couple ideas, but it doesn’t matter.  The information belongs to us and should be posted and accessible to everyone that wants to see it.

You can see the numbers on the 2010 report there, but not 2011 yet.  And of course, Rodney Monroe has directed that all access to crime statistics be removed for years.  This makes it easy to manipulate the numbers to whatever you wish to represent without letting anyone check your math or look at the reports.  City Manager Curt Walton, Mayor Foxx, City Council members (unless some of the new ones stand up to correct this) have supported this so far.

Whether supervisors all the way up to Rodney Monroe are telling officers not to make reports, or to downgrade the level or crimes, or if they are instituting programs to keep some crimes completely off the books, the numbers don’t add up and they still won’t release the true crime reports.

It seems as long as our Police Chief and politicians are able to say crime is down in Charlotte, it doesn’t matter if that statement is based in truth.

SHOPLIFTER OFFENDER PROJECT REMOVING LARCENIES?

The full picture is not in yet, but one program that seems to take some significant number of crimes off the books is SHOP: the Shoplifting Offenders Project.

There will be more in upcoming posts about this project and associated statistics, but first consider these numbers taken from the CMPD Annual Report for 2010 of reported crimes:

Larceny makes up 57% of Charlotte's Reported Type I Crime (2010 Statistics)

CMPD has refused to answer several important questions about SHOP.

Sworn officers are required by UCR (Uniform Crime Reporting) Standards to report all crimes known to them.  This SHOP project seems designed to remove a large number of larcenies from the reporting system.  The requirements of this Project that would trigger a police response differ with the law and with UCR reporting standards.  CMPD will provide no response to this.

SHOP was initiated at the 10 locations known to have highest shoplifting numbers:

Walmart 7735 N. Tryon St University City

Kohl’s 9315 N. Tryon St University City

Walmart 3240 Wilkinson Bv Freedom

Southpark 4400 Sharon Rd Providence

Walmart 1830 Galleria Bv Independence

Walmart 3304 Eastway Dr Eastway

Walmart 9820 Callabridge Ct North

Northlake 6801 Northlake Mall North

Belks 7115 Northlake Mall North

Kohl’s 9579 South Blvd Steele Creek

Two locations have since dropped from the program, but the department refuses to say why.  Also, there have been new locations added.  Again, the department refuses to say how many or which locations.

Direct contact with Loss Prevention (LP) personnel and management at various retail locations, both on the program and off, report multiple shoplifting events per day at each of their stores rather than a couple per week as CMPD says.  They also reported that if they do get police involved, they often call a special direct number which is not 311 or 911, so the report is offline and possibly not recorded at all.

Specific data on reported statistics will be presented soon, but the chart above shows why this one project could have such an impact.

If 57% of all the Part I crimes you report for the City are larcenies, and you can find a way to remove a significant portion of larcenies from the books, with that one move alone, that would show a huge drop in the crime rate without any actual drop in crime.

When asked for the total number of larcenies, for the City of Charlotte for a couple of different time periods, the CMPD wouldn’t give that information.  They did say there were 2073 reported cases of shoplifting citywide from 1/1/2010 to 7/31/2010.  Huh?  What kind of strange answer is this?  Seven months…  For sake of comparison, the annual report says there were 3706 shoplifting cases city-wide for the full year 2010.

Other crimes and how they are being reported as well as more about SHOP will be in upcoming posts.

To catch up, please see this previous post which was part 6 about crime stats and Comp Stat, and which has links at the bottom to parts 1 through 5.


THE FBI, TYPE I CRIMES, and COMP STAT

The FBI tracks crime using a national standard that attempts to normalize differences among local authorities.  It takes in data as it is reported to them from the local crime agencies. These eight categories that are collected and reported by the FBI are considered the most serious and are referred to as TYPE I crimes. 

Violent crime:

1.    murder and non-negligent manslaughter,

2.    forcible rape,

3.    robbery, and

4.    aggravated assault) and

Property crime

5.    burglary

6.    larceny-theft

7.    motor vehicle theft

8.    arson

Type II crimes which are considered less serious are not counted in TYPE I crime indexes, and so would not make the crime rate appear higher.  If it’s possible to “move” a crime from the category of TYPE I to TYPE II, or not report it at all, that makes the crime rate appear lower.

Crime Statistics reported across the country for 2011 were down with the percentages shown in the FBI chart below.  One option is crime is really falling everywhere, which means any particular credit for crime falling should possibly be offset by percentages across the country.  There would be other considerations for specifics that apply to large cities vs. small towns and more.

Another possibility is the issue that has come up in New York (birthplace of the Comp Stat system used here in Charlotte), Baltimore, Nashville, and Charlotte:  that the crime statistics may not be accurate in other cities, either.  There have been allegations and plenty of proof provided that a combination of career ambition and corruption have proved detrimental to honest and accurate reporting of crime statistics.

Permitting the people in charge and getting promotions to hide the data involved is a bad idea, too.

Comp Stat has been shown to be a very powerful tool that can be exploited for good or corruption.  That’s where good leadership comes into play. 

 

From FBI.gov

Comp Stat, Investigations, Crime Reporting (Part 6)

MORE ON THE COMP STAT STORY OUT OF NY & NC

This is a continuation of the previous post by citynewswatch, but part 6 of a series about reporting of Crime Statistics by the Charlotte Mecklenburg Police Department and politicians here in the City of Charlotte who will not relent and take on their oversight responsibilities to investigate numbers that don’t add up.

Please read the last post, which was largely about how one brave NYPD officer, Adrian Schoolcraft tried to speak to his precinct commanders, then Internal Affairs, about disturbing orders to refuse to take criminal complaints, to downgrade severity of crimes in order to make crime appear lower, and also to arrest or at least detain people for no crime at all, just to harass them.  NYPD is the originator of the Comp Stat system which is used here in Charlotte—a computerized crime tracking and reporting system.

After he spoke freely to the NYPD, without representation, and gave evidence of the wrongdoing going on, he says he experienced retaliation on the job.  He has a recorded and undisputed account of his precincts’ Deputy Chief and more than a dozen others forcibly coming into his apartment as he was resting, informing him that he was going to be declared mentally ill, strip searching him, then taking him away without cause for six days without access to the outside world.  Even though he has moved 350 miles away, NYPD officers still come pounding on his door.

MORE OFFICERS COMING FORWARD

But more officers are coming forward in support now.  After Schoolcraft turned to the Village Voice, who reported extensively on his ordeal and on the impact of misreporting the crime statistics, other officers started to come forward and the pressure on command was enough to force investigations.  Those who contact the press can remain anonymous, and they won’t have the fear of retribution from the commanders causing corrupt practices in the first place.

The post also contains one very specific other tragic outcome from the misreporting of crime:  a series of attacks by a rapist that went undetected until at least the seventh attack because the pattern was not established in the reports.

CHARLOTTE’S CONFLICTING CRIME STAT STORIES

Continuing from these thoughts, and re-focusing on Charlotte which also uses the Comp Stat program, it’t confounding to see a series of reports from local media outlets, based on what the CMPD and the Attorney General release to them, which are seemingly at odds on the same day in the Charlotte Observer:  Jun. 29, 2011

Statewide crime rate at lowest level in 33 years

The overall crime rate dropped 5.6 in 2010, while violent crime was down 10.2 percent compared to the previous year, state Attorney General Roy Cooper said today.

Cooper announced the annual tally at a press conference at the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department.

Statewide, murders fell 7.3 percent, while rapes dropped 14.3 percent and robberies were down 19.4 percent. There were 468 murders in the state last year, 5.1 per 100,000 residents.

All categories of property crime also fell, led by motor vehicle thefts, which were down 12.5 percent.

Note that all crime statistics in the state have fallen.  This is not exclusive to Charlotte.  These statistics are being reported by other local agencies up to the State, who in turn is reporting them as given.  Whether their reporting standards and numbers are equally murky as Charlotte’s is unknown.

Earlier in the year, January 7^th, 2011, Cleve Wootsen, Jr. wrote for the Charlotte Observer as well “Police: Crime Stats Accurate.” 

Local police are thoroughly trained in how to accurately classify and record crime, says Deputy Chief Kerr Putney. Supervisors review officers' initial crime reports to help ensure accuracy, and the department conducts periodic audits.

"You've got to trust your people...," says Putney. "We don't have a lot of instances where people are misclassifying or falsifying or underreporting crime."   The FBI recently reviewed a small sample of CMPD crime reports and made only minor suggestions to improve uniformity of reporting.

No error numbers out of that small sample set were given in the report.

On exactly the same day is another Charlotte Observer report by Franco Ordonez and Cleve Wootsen, Jr. that Charlotte has become a major hub for black tar heroin use.  Major Glenn Neimeyer and other publications declared Charlotte to be in the top five cities in the U.S. for black tar heroin use.

   So, while congratulations are in order on this big “bust” the content of the article clearly states that the problem of black tar heroin in Charlotte is large and growing.  So how does that square up with the shrinking Crime Statistics and happy faces put out by the CMPD, Curt Walton, Mayor Foxx, and the City Council?  It doesn’t.  If you ask the hospitals and treatment centers, as these authors did, they tell you about the real problem.  The addicts are getting their drugs from the dealers described, who are running drug cartels, and they’re not using fake guns and non-criminals to buy, transport, and sell them in our neighborhoods.  Each of those events are crimes, usually gang-driven.

Alarm sounded over black tar heroin use in Charlotte

"It's as serious as the beginning of the crack cocaine epidemic," said UNC Charlotte criminal justice professor Paul Friday. "And the reason it is serious is because it can expand so quickly."

Friday spoke to the Charlotte City Council on Monday, warning about increasing use of the highly addictive drug that seems particularly prevalent in affluent areas and among young people. He was joined by Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police, who told council members that suppliers are Mexican-based cartels that operate as efficiently as a business.

"We take a cell off the street and oftentimes, they'll make another cell in the next five days because they're at the bottoms of the distribution chain," Maj. Glen Neimeyer said at a Tuesday press conference.

Ten years ago, doctors at CMC-Mercy rarely saw a patient addicted to black tar heroin in its detoxification program. Now 40 percent of their patients are being treated for abuse of black tar heroin and related prescription drug abuse, said Robert Martin, the hospital's director of the substance abuse services.

The article details one arrest of a man named Gonzalez, typical of black tar heroin dealers, but not necessarily reflected in our crime stats (the article notes CMPD did not release statistics at a press conference on the topic):

According to the U.S. Attorney in Charlotte, Gonzalez was arrested in possession of more than $50,000 in cash, hundreds of balloons used to package heroin, and two firearms.

FBI RELEASED NATIONAL GANG DATA

The story for Charlotte wasn’t good as FBI released gang data this week for the whole country, attributing about 50% of crime to gang related activity.  There will be more on this topic coming up.

LOOKING FOR OTHER DATA

When New York journalists for the Village Voice investigated information from hospitals, as compared to the pleasant picture painted by the crime statistics released by NYPD, what they found didn’t add up, either.  In October, 2005, Paul Moses wrote “These Stats Are a Crime: While Bloomberg boasts of crime drop, the hospitals' work on assault victims is booming”

The article outlines a huge political campaign by Mayor Michael Bloomberg announcing "the neighborhoods of New York have become safer than ever."  Meanwhile, from the time of the article, authors found:

The number of people who went to New York City hospitals because they were assaulted jumped sharply in four of the last five years for which figures are available—a direct contrast to the plunging number of assaults the NYPD reported.

But the stark contrast between these two sets of official statistics demonstrates again the need for a thorough, independent probe of the police department's crime reports.  And it shows how wrong it was for the Bloomberg administration to have allowed the NYPD to thwart a probe earlier this year (2005) of the crime statistics.

According to health statistics on the city government's website, more and more assault victims flocked to emergency rooms for four years in a row. In 2002, the last year for which data is available and Bloomberg's first year in office, the number of assault victims either hospitalized or treated in emergency rooms shot up 6 percent from the year before.

The police department reported a 10 percent drop in aggravated assaults, according to FBI records.

Even the ‘Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association President Patrick Lynch had said that officers "are forced to falsify stats in order to maintain the appearance of a drastic reduction in crime," the Daily News reported.   And Sergeants Benevolent Association president Ed Mullins said his sergeants had witnessed assaults being downgraded to harassment cases.   In the face of even the Policemen’s associations’ public statements that the numbers and reports were falsified, they had set up a Commission to Combat Police Corruption comprised of mayoral appointees.

But the NYPD would not cooperate and Mayor Bloomberg didn’t do his duty to assist the chairman or enforce subpoena power, causing Chairman Pomerantz to resign with no support from those who appointed the committee, which now seemed to be a total sham.  All of this happened before Officer Schoolcraft’s ordeal or the sexual attacks of the women explored in the last post.

The article goes on to say:

It must be said that the police department has made sure its own relevant numbers remain secret. The department has stonewalled Freedom of Information Law requests for its data and, as Pomerantz testified in April, refused to hand over information even to a mayoral commission responsible for policing the police.

When the commission sought records, police officials responded that alleged falsifying of crime statistics is outside the corruption commission's jurisdiction because it is not a form of corruption.

But the police department's critics in the unions had alleged a blatant fraud—one involving government records used to make vital decisions about public safety.

That's a corruption allegation.

In the early years of the police department's Comp Stat program—in which the police brass comes down hard on any precinct commander whose crime numbers fail to fall—both hospitalizations for assaults and the police tally for assaults fell sharply.

But then that started to change. Police continued to record a downward trend in serious assaults, but in recent years, hospitalizations for assaults leveled off and emergency room visits increased sharply. Also, the number of "simple assaults"—lesser offenses not included in the FBI's index of serious crimes—dropped sharply at first, but, with some ups and downs, leveled off.

1995 was a banner year for reducing assaults: Police tallied a 14 percent drop in aggravated assaults and the health department would later report that the number of people hospitalized for assault fell 15 percent.

That didn't continue. The patterns are consistent with what the police unions have charged: The impressive crime reductions through the middle 1990s were real, but afterward, a "fudge factor" began to emerge because police commanders felt pressured to manipulate crime reports for the seven "index" crimes reported to the FBI.

As the Voice reported in March, a PBA official explained it this way in the organization's magazine:

"You eventually hit a wall where you can't push [crime] down any more. . .  So how do you fake a crime decrease? It's pretty simple.

Don't file reports, misclassify crimes from felonies to misdemeanors, undervalue the property lost to crime so it's not a felony, and report a series of crimes as a single event. A particularly insidious way to fudge the numbers is to make it difficult or impossible for people to report crimes—in other words, make the victims feel like criminals so they walk away just to spare themselves further pain and suffering"

It doesn't mean that the drops in every category of crime are questionable. It doesn't mean that the city is radically more dangerous than thought. But it could mean that the more recent crime drops are not as great as the public has been led to believe. Reports for some offenses, such as grand larceny or assault, are more easily manipulated than others. Assaults can be taken off the books by downgrading them from felonies to misdemeanors, or recording them under another charge, such as harassment.

Once again: If the NYPD wants to show the continuing drop in major crimes is real, it can start by releasing the mass of crime complaint data on its computers for all charges, precinct by precinct, annually since at least 1993—and not just the "index" crimes. That would show whether there is a pattern of downgrading complaints to lower the numbers for the seven major index crimes. It can release the audits police officials say are done twice a year in all precincts, instead of withholding them, as the department does now. It can disclose whatever data it has for the categories that might allow a reported crime to be turned into something else—lost property, say. And it can grant access to the records that officers submit in their precincts when a crime is reported.

ALLEGATIONS OF CAREER ABUSE

Aside from the terrible case of Officer Schoolcraft, abuse of citizens and the public trust, there are allegations that the Comp Stat system itself can be used as a tool to target individual officers, often mid-level managers and supervisors.  Academics who have devoted years of study and work in the area particularly to Comp Stat and Criminal Justice have surveyed, interviewed, and quoted hundreds of NYPD commanders about the drawbacks of the actual model.  Some quotations are from retired commanders and some from active duty.

Professor John Eterno , researcher, Chairman of the Department of Criminal Justice at Molloy College and a retired NYPD Captain.  Eli Silverman is Professor Emeritus at John Jay College of Criminal Justice.

Eterno and Silverman continue with their critique of the Comp Stat model with quotes from actual NYPD commanders about the drawbacks of the model.

Expanding on data from a survey of high-ranking supervisors in an article in the journal Professional Issues in Criminal Justice, Eterno and Silverman now include quotations from those anonymous bosses about the drawbacks of Comp Stat.

Keep in mind that these are NYPD captains, deputy inspectors, inspectors and chiefs-- men and woman trusted to run precincts and borough commands, detective squads and narcotics units. Some of them are retired. Some are still on active duty.

Other supervisors described Comp Stat meeting as "abusive."

Another retired supervisors alleges that Comp Stat was a good tool that was used for personal vendettas by some commanders.

"Comp Stat," another writes, "was a tool of 1PP to elevate/end careers at will."

And there's bias as well, he adds. "Often the managers during the Comp Stat process are treated very differently depending on who has been 'chosen' to advance at a rapid rate."

Read the full article from 10/10/2010 by Graham Rayman of the Village Voice titled “The NYPD Tapes:  NYPD Commanders Critique Comp Stat and the Reviews Aren’t Good”

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See what’s happening and compare to what Chicago’s new Mayor Rahm Emmanuel has recently instituted at http://data.cityofchicago.org/  It's a very good start toward openness in government, in matters from crime to building permits to government services and contacts, jobs and employees.  Transportation is covered… all the data is there.  Some of it is still raw and less user-friendly, but at least it’s available to search and study, download and process by academics and investigative agencies.  That’s transparency in a city that’s been screaming out for it. 

Here, there is nothing but silence from any City Council Member, from Mayor Foxx, from City Manager Walton, From Chief Monroe, or anyone else “in charge.” 

Please write to those people listed above and demand the information we are entitled to, not just once, but systemically.  We have paid for the systems and the personnel to make it happen.  Instead, the lawyers we pay for are blocking the release of the data to cover whatever is going on in a number of areas.  That's not acceptable for our public data.

Please ask for accountability for the personnel and financial decisions made by Monroe as well.  Please let citynewswatch know how it’s going.  All main contacts are listed here on the site, to your right.

And continue contacting citynewswatch directly--anonymity is key.

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Here are links to the first five Crime Reporting posts by citynewswatch:

CrimeReporting Questions and Jealous Reporters (Part 1)

Significant Events in Crime Reporting(Part 2)

CMPD Says Web Site "UnderConstruction" (Part 3)

Prostitution Sting in Charlotte, Crime Reporting (Part 4)

Why Every Citizen Should Care About Correct Crime Statistics (Part 5)

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